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Abstract—This paper studies a variant of the Pliable Index
CODing (PICOD) problem, i.e., an index coding problem where
a user can be satisfied by decoding any message that is not in
its side information set, where communication is decentralized,
i.e., it occurs among users rather than by the central server,
and secure, i.e., each user is allowed to decode only one message
outside its side information set and must not be able to collect
any information about any other message that is not its decoded
one. Given the difficulty of the general version of this problem,
this paper focuses on the case where the side information sets
are ‘s circular shifts’, namely, user u’s side information set is
the set of messages indexed by {u, u+1, . . . , u+ s−1} for some
fixed s and where the indices are intended modulo the cardinality
of the message set. This particular setting has been studied in
the ‘decentralized non-secure’ and in the ‘centralized secure’
settings, thus allows one to quantify the cost of decentralized
communication under security constraints on the number of
transmissions. Interestingly, the decentralized vs the centralized
secure setting incurs a multiplicative gap of approximately three.
This is in contrast to the cases without security constraint, where
the multiplicative gap is known to be at most two.
I. INTRODUCTION
Index Coding (IC) consists of one transmitter with m
independent messages and n users. The users are connected to
the transmitter through an error-free broadcast link. The users
have side information sets locally available to them, which are
subsets of the m messages. Each user has a pre-determined
message as its desired message to decode. The transmitter
has knowledge of all users’ side information sets and desired
messages, which it uses to generate the codewords that en-
able every user to decode its desired message. Users decode
based on the received codeword from the transmitter and the
messages in their side information set. The question is to find
the minimum number of transmissions/code-length such that
every user can decode its desired messages successfully. In
this paper we study the decentralized, secure and pliable IC
problem, which is motivated by three variants of IC: Pliable
Index CODing (PICOD), decentralized IC, and secure IC.
a) Pliability: The PICOD problem is motivated by sce-
narios where the desired messages for the users are not pre-
determined. Such situations include Internet radio, streaming
services, online advertisement system, etc. In these cases, the
transmitter can leverage the freedom of choosing the desired
messages for the users, together with the side information sets
at the users, to minimize the cost of transmission. PICOD was
proposed in [1], where the system includes a single transmitter,
m message, and n users with message side information sets.
Different from IC, in the PICOD each user is satisfied when-
ever it can decode a message that is not in its side information
set. The goal in the PICOD is to find the assignment of desired
messages for the users and the corresponding transmission
strategy that lead to the shortest possible code-length.
From the achievability side, results from [1], [4], [15]
show that PICOD affords an exponential code-length reduction
compared to IC under the linear encoding constraint. From the
converse side under linear constraint, the work in [15] provides
a lower bound on the required number of transmissions in
order for the randomly generated PICOD problem to be
satisfied. In [7], we derived the information theoretical optimal
code-length for some PICOD’s with symmetric structure in
the side information sets (among which the class ‘PICOD
with circular-arc side information’ of interest in this paper)
by leveraging novel combinatorial arguments. In [11], [12] the
Authors also derived information theoretical converse bounds
by explicitly leveraging the ‘absent users’ in the system.
b) Decentralized Communication: The decentralized IC
is motivated by peer-to-peer and ad-hoc network where there
is no central transmitter/server. Here, the codewords are gen-
erated by the users based their side information set and sent
through a time-sharing noiseless broadcast channel. The goal
in decentralized IC is to find the shortest code-length that
allows all users to decode their desired message.
The decentralized IC is a special case of the multi-sender
IC [10] and of the distributed IC (where the system has m
messages and 2m − 1 servers with different message sets
available for encoding) [8]. Recently, the decentralized IC has
been studied in [13] under the name embedded IC (where the
information available for encoding at the servers is the same as
the side information sets at the users), where it is shown that
the optimal number of transmissions under linear encoding
constraint does not increase by more than a multiplicative
factor of 2 when turning a linear code for the IC to a linear
code for embedded IC. A task-based solution (i.e., a one-short
scheme) for the embedded IC was discussed in [3].
We studied the decentralized PICOD in [5], where we
proved the information theoretical optimal number of transmis-
sions for all those centralized PICOD’s we had solved in [7];
interestingly, in these cases we showed that the multiplicative
gap between the optimal number of transmissions of the
centralized vs the decentralized setting is often very close to
or exactly equal to 1, meaning that decentralized transmission
imposes a very minimal cost in terms of network load.
c) Secure Communication: Security in IC has been stud-
ied from several perspectives. IC with an eavesdropper, who
has a limited access to the side information sets and to the
transmitted codeword, was proposed in [2]; in such a model
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the transmitter needs to satisfy all users while preventing
the eavesdropper from getting any new information from the
transmissions. Another studied model is ‘security against other
users’ where the transmitter wants to prevent the users from
knowing the content of the desired messages of the other users
from the received broadcast codewords. In [9] the cases of (i)
strong security (a user does not learn any information from the
set of the non-desired messages) with secure key and (ii) weak
security (a user may learn some information from the set of
the non-desired messages but does not infer any information
on the non-desired messages, also referred to as ‘individual
security’) without secure key were investigated.
Recently, the Authors of [14] studied the case of ‘weak
security against other users’ in PICOD’s with ‘s circular
shift’ side information set structure, namely, user u’s side
information set is the set of messages indexed by {u, u +
1, . . . , u + s − 1} for some fixed s and where the indices
are intended modulo the cardinality of the message set m.
In [6] we generalized the problem setup of [14] and provided
linear codes whose length is at most one more than a converse
bound under the constraint of linear encoding. Our results
for centralized PICOD with ‘s circular shift’ side information
structure demonstrate a multiplicative gap between secure and
non-secure versions of the problem that is not bounded in
general; in particular, for s ≥ m/2 the two cases have the
same information theoretic optimal code-length; however, for
1 ≤ s < m/2 and under the constraint of linear encoding,
the minimal number of transmissions for the secure PICOD is
lowered bounded by essentially m/(2s), while the non-secure
PICOD can always be satisfied by at most 2 transmissions.
Contribution and Paper Organization: The decentralized
secure PICOD studied in this paper is the ‘individual secure’
version of the decentralized PICOD, motivated by the com-
munication system without central transmitter such as peer-to-
peer networks. In practice, security is a very important factor
in peer-to-peer networks, since such networks usually consist
of many anonymous users, and malicious users can get into
the networks comparatively easily. Security against other users
in the systems guarantees that the files that are shared over the
network will not fall into the hands of malicious users.
Given the difficulty of the PICOD in general, we focus here
on the case of ‘s circular shift’ side information set structure as
in [6], [14]. We show that, under a linear encoding constraint,
several cases that are feasible in the centralized setting become
infeasible in decentralized setting. Our bounds reveal:
1) On the one hand, when mm−s ∈ Z, i.e., one transmission
can satisfy all users in the centralized non-secure PICOD
setting, the information theoretical optimal number of
transmissions is ms , which coincides with the optimality
result for the decentralized case without security. Thus,
in this decentralized setting security comes for free.
2) On the other hand, when mm−s 6∈ Z, i.e., two trans-
mission can satisfy all users in the centralized non-
secure PICOD setting, things are very different. Under
linear encoding constraint, we show the converse bound
`? ≥ 3m2s , which seems to indicate that we need roughly
3 times more transmission compared to the case of
centralized secure PICOD with linear encoding. This
converse bound is shown to be tight in some cases.
The multiplicative gap between the centralized and
decentralized secure PICODs is strictly larger than the
one between centralized and decentralized non-secure
PICODs with the same side information set structure.
This shows a fundamental difference when we impose
security constraints in decentralized settings.
3) Our achievability result does not cover all decentralized
secure PICOD’s with ‘s circular shift’ side information
sets, namely, at the time of submitting this paper we had
not find a general scheme for all odd values of message
size m. We observe that for odd m and mm−s /∈ Z,
there are many infeasible cases under the linear encoding
constraint. However, not all odd m and mm−s /∈ Z are
infeasible; for example, the case (m, s) = (11, 8) is
feasible. The feasibility for general odd m is subject
of current investigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model; Section III provides the main
results and discussion; Section IV proves the infeasibility
result of Theorem 1; Section V and Section VI prove the
converse and achievability parts for Theorem 2, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Throughout the paper we use the following notation. For
integers 1 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 we let [a1 : a2] := {a1, a1+1, . . . , a2},
and [a2] := [1 : a2]. A capital letter as a subscript denotes set
of elements whose indices are in the set, i.e., WA := {wa :
wa ∈W,a ∈ A}. For two sets A and B, A \B is the set that
consists all the elements that are in A but not in B.
In this paper we study the decentralized secure PICOD
problem with m messages and with ‘s circular shift’ side
information sets defines as follows.
1) m ∈ N users and no central transmitter. The user set is
denoted as U := {u1, u2, . . . , um}.
2) m messages. The messages are of κ ∈ N independent
and uniformly distributed bits. The message set is de-
noted as W := {w1, w2, . . . , wm}.
3) User ui, i ∈ [m], knows the messages indexed by its
side information set Ai := [i : (i + s − 1) mod m].
The collection of all side information sets, denoted as
A := {A1, A2, . . . , An}, is assumed globally known
at all users. For valid setup we have s ∈ [m − 1],
i.e., the users have some but not all messages as side
information.
4) A shared noiseless broadcast channel connects all users
in the system. The users broadcast their codewords to
all the other users one at a time.
5) The codewords are generated by each user based on
their side information set. In other words, the overall
transmission is x`κ := {x`1κ, . . . , x`nκ} where code-
word x`jκ is generated by the j-th user as
xκ`j := ENCj(WAj ,A), ∀j ∈ [m], (1)
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR PICOD’S WITH CIRCULAR SHIFT SIDE INFORMATION SETS.
Without security With security
Infeasible cases: m
m−s /∈ Z, odd m, s = 1 or s = m− 2.
Centralized `?it =
{
1, m
m−s ∈ Z,
2, m
m−s /∈ Z.
`?it =
{
1, m
m−s ∈ Z,
2, m
m−s /∈ Z and s > m/2.
dbm
s
c/2e ≤ `? =
{
dbm
s
c/2e, m
m−s /∈ Z, s < m2 , ms ∈ Z,
dbm
s
c/2e+ 1, m
m−s /∈ Z, s < m2 , ms /∈ Z.
Infeasible cases: m
m−s /∈ Z, s = 1, 2 or s = 3,m− 2 with odd m
Decentralized `?it =
{
m
s
, m
m−s ∈ Z,
2, m
m−s /∈ Z.
`?it = m/s,
m
m−s ∈ Z
3m
2s
≤ `? =
{
3m
2s
, m
m−s /∈ Z, m2s ∈ Z,
m
2
+ 2− d s
2
e, m
m−s /∈ Z, even m.
for some function ENCj .
The total code-length is ` :=
∑
j∈[m] `j and
6) The decoding function at the j-th user is
ŵj := DECj(WAj , x
`κ), ∀j ∈ [m], (2)
for some function DECj .
A decoding success is declared for user uj if ŵj = wdj
for some dj ∈ [m] \ Aj . That is, user uj decodes a
message that is outside its own side information set.
7) The decoding at the j-th user must also be ‘individually
secure’ meaning it must satisfy
I(Wi|xκ`,WAj ,A) = 0, ∀i ∈ [m] \ ({dj} ∪Aj). (3)
8) Given (m, s), we aim to find the smallest ` such that
the decoding is successful and individually secure at
all users. We assume κ can be arbitrarily large for
asymptotic analysis. We indicate the optimal code-length
as `?it (subscript ‘it’ sands for ‘information theoretically
optimal’). If we restrict the encoding functions to be
linear maps, the optimal code-length is denoted by `?
(without any subscript, so as not to clutter the notation).
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our main results in this paper are as follows.
Theorem 1 (Infeasible cases): For the decentralized secure
PICOD with circular shift side information sets and linear
encoding, in the following cases it is not possible to satisfy
all users while maintaining the security constraint:
1) s = 1,m ≥ 3;
2) s = 2,m ≥ 5;
3) s = 3 and odd m;
4) s = m− 2 and odd m.
Theorem 2 (Converse bound with multiplicative gap of 3
compared to the centralized setting): For the decentralized
secure PICOD with circular shift side information sets, when
m/(m− s) ∈ Z we have `?it = m/s, otherwise
3m
2s
≤ `? ≤
{
3m
2s , m/2s ∈ Z,
m
2 + 2− d s2e, m/2s /∈ Z and even m.
(4)
Table I summarizes known results for the PICOD problem
with circular shift side information sets in four setups (cen-
tralized vs. decentralized transmission, and with vs. without
security constraint). We can see that, for the case m/(m−s) ∈
Z, the minimal number of transmissions is the same as the
case without security constraint. In this case the security
constraint does not make any difference. However, the case
m/(m− s) 6∈ Z behaves differently:
• In decentralized PICOD, many feasible non-secure cases
become infeasible because of the security constraint.
Compared to the centralized setting, we have more in-
feasible cases in the decentralized setting. For instance,
the centralized case with s = 2 is feasible but becomes
infeasible in the decentralized setting.
• Our general converse bound under linear encoding con-
straint is `? ≥ 3m/(2s). The multiplicative gap to the
centralized secure PICOD when s < m/2 is roughly 3.
Note that the gap between the centralized [7] and de-
centralized [5] PICOD without security constraint is at
most 2. Our results show that when security constraints
are imposed, the cost of decentralization for PICOD
becomes substantially larger.
• We can also quantify the impact of decentralized com-
munication on non-secure vs. secure PICOD. In the
centralized setting, security constraints change the linear
optimality result only when s < m/3. In the decen-
tralized setting, security constraints change the linear
optimality for at least for s < 3m/4, which is strictly
larger than the above.
• We remark that our results on decentralized secure PI-
COD is incomplete at the time of submitting this paper.
Our general achievable scheme for even m does not
exactly match the converse bound in general. For odd
m, there are many cases for which we can neither prove
or disapprove feasibility at this point; for example, for
m = 11 the cases s = 1, 2, 3, 9 are infeasible while
s = 10, 8 are feasible, but the other cases are still
open. Nonetheless, our results already show a funda-
mental difference between decentralized and centralized
secure PICOD. Completing the characterization of the
decentralized secure PICOD is part of ongoing work.
IV. INFEASIBLE CASES
In this section we show that the cases in Theorem 1 do not
have a feasible linear solutions.
We note that in the proofs below we do not limit ourselves to
scalar or one-shot schemes. In general, the transmissions can
be linear combinations of fractions of messages, since each
message consists κ bits. Therefore, one transmission may not
allow users to decode a complete message but just a part of
it. However, by the security constraint, a user can not decode
any parts for the messages that are not its desired message.
If a user decodes a part of one message, the message is the
desired message of the user. Then by the converse argument,
the user will eventually decode its desired message and be
able to mimic the other user.
a) Case s = 1, m ≥ 3: In this case each user only
has one message in its side information set. Since in the
decentralized setting the codewords are generated based on
the local message knowledge, we can assume without loss of
generality that user u1 does the first transmission. For the first
transmission, u1 can only generate a codeword based on its
side information w1, and thus without loss of generality it
transmits w1. This will allow all other users to decode w1.
Once w1 has been decoded, all other users who have w1 in
their side information set can mimic user u1 and thus decode
message wd1 (where d1 is the index of the desired message by
user u1). When m 6= 3, there are more than two users who can
mimic user u1 and there is at least one user who can decode
more than one messages. This case is thus infeasible.
Note that this argument is true even without the linear
encoding constraint. Therefore the result here is information
theoretical.
b) s = 2, m ≥ 5: With linear encoding, the codewords
are linear combinations of the locally available messages. The
first transmission is thus a linear combination of at most
two messages. We observe that a linear combination of two
consecutive messages violates the security constraint. This is
so because of the following. Without loss of generality assume
the first transmission is done by user u2. On the one hand, user
u2 can send a linear combination of messages w2 and w3; by
receiving this transmission, user u1 (who has w2) can decode
w3 and user u3 (who has w3) can decode w2; now both users
u1 and u3 can now mimic user u2 and decode wd2 ; since
A1 ∩ A3 = ∅, wd2 can not be in the side information sets of
both user u1 and user u3, therefore, u1 or u3 must be able
to decode one more message outside their side information
set which violates the security constraint. On the other hand,
sending an uncoded message one at a time is not secure by [6,
Proposition 1] not even in the centralized case. We conclude
that there is no feasible linear solution in this case.
c) s = 3 and odd m: The transmission can only be a
linear combination of two messages with adjacent indices. One
transmission determine the desired messages of two users. The
same message can not be involved in two different transmis-
sions. Therefore the involved messages of all transmissions
are disjoint and linear combinations of the transmissions are
not useful in terms of decoding. ` transmissions then always
satisfy 2` users. However, the number of users m is odd in
this case. There will be always at least one unsatisfied user.
Otherwise the security constraint will be violated. We conclude
there is no feasible solution for this case.
Note that for either s = 2,m ≥ 5 or s = 3,m odd,
the argument holds true for any invertible mapping, thus not
necessarily a linear code. We have however not been able
to derive yet a fully information theoretic converse (i.e., no
restriction on the encoding map).
d) s = m−2 and odd m: This case is infeasible since it
is infeasible in the centralized case without constraint of linear
encoding. Thus it is also infeasible in the decentralized case.
V. CONVERSE BOUND
In this section we prove the converse bound `? ≥ 3m2s under
the linear encoding constraint for mm−s /∈ Z. We construct a
‘chain of desired message pairs’ which provides an inequality.
We then derive a lower bound based on the maximum number
of satisfied users. By combining these two inequalities we have
the desired converse bound.
a) Desired Message Pairs: With linear encoding, each
transmission is a linear function of the messages in the side
information set of the transmitting user (i.e., we neglect the
messages that a user may have already decoded thanks to
previous transmissions by other users). This is without loss
of generality because if the transmission involves codewords
sent in previous time slots, we can do the transmission by
just sending the part that is only involving the messages in
the side information set and the rest of the users will add the
contribution of the previous transmissions themselves.
Let us consider the codeword generator matrix G of the
overall linear code. The i-th transmission is the i-th row of G,
and is denoted as gi. Let Span(G) denote the row vector linear
span of G. Under the decentralized setting, each transmission
involves the messages that are in one user’s side information
set. By [6, Proposition 1], Span(G) does not include any
standard basis vector. That is, each transmission involves at
least two messages. Let bi ≤ s−1 be the range of the messages
that are involved in i-th transmission. Explicitly, the i-th row
of G can have at most bi nonzero elements, in the range
[ai : ai+ bi− 1 mod m], between the ai-th and (ai+ bi− 1)
mod m-th elements. By the argument in Section IV-0b, the
transmission can not involve the first and the last messages
in the side information set at the same time. Therefore, the
messages that are involved in one transmission are in the range
bi ∈ [2 : s− 1].
Fig. 1 illustrates the users, their desired messages, and sent
codewords: the users are denoted by their side information
set that is represented as a rectangle; the desired messages
are devoted by the circled numbers next to a user; and the
codewords are denoted by arrows, with their ranges shown
over the arrows. Without loss of generality, assume a1 = 1. By
the first transmission, ub1−s+1 mod m determines the desired
message by ui to be wb1 , and the desired message by u2
to be w1. Note that the desired messages of these two
users are adjacent to their side information sets. Therefore,
these two users can mimic other users by decoding their
desired messages. Specifically, ub1−s+1 mod m can mimic
ub1−s+2 mod m and u2 can mimic u1. To satisfy the security
constraint, the desired messages of ub1−s+2 mod m and u1
must be db1−s+2 mod m = b1 − s+ 1 mod m and d1 =
s+ 1, respectively.
Now consider u1. To satisfy u1, there must exist a vector
v1 ∈ Span(G) such that its (s + 1)-th element is nonzero
and all its nonzero elements are in the range [1 : s + 1].
By a linear combination of v1 and g1 (the first row of the
generator matrix), we can generate a vector g2 such that
its 1st element is zero, its (s + 1)-th element is nonzero,
and all its nonzero elements are in the range [2 : s + 1].
Therefore, g2 and g1 are linearly independent, and g2 is a
valid row of G. The transmission of g2, besides satisfying
user u1, also satisfies user us−b2+3, whose decoded message
must be ws−b2+2. After decoding its desired message, user
us−b2+3 can mimic us−b2+2 thus the desired message of
us−b2+2 must be w2s−b2+1. Now we focus on us−b2+2. By a
similar argument, we can see there must exist a g3 such that
its nonzero elements are in the range [s− b2+3 : 2s− b2+1]
and the (2s−b2+1)-th element is nonzero. Vector g3 leads to
the determination of the desired messages of another two users
in the system and then of vector g4 for another transmission.
We can see that the desired messages we found by this
argument can be grouped into pairs. For instances, (w1, ws+1)
and (ws−b2+2, w2s−b2+1) are two such pairs, denoted as the
circled ‘1’ and ‘2’ in Fig. 1. The two messages in a pair are
at a distance of s + 1. The i-th and (i − 1)-th pairs have a
range overlap of size bi. The desired message pairs and the
codewords form a ‘chain’: the desired message pair requires
a codeword; the codeword then determines the new desired
message pair based on its range. In this way, the ‘chain’
keeps until the newly determined desired message has already
been generated. For instance, in Fig. 1, the message wb1 is a
desired message generated by the first transmission; since it
is generated again by the third transmission, the chain stops
with three transmissions. The adjacent desired message pairs
have a shift of s+1− bi, shown in Fig. 1 as the solid arrows.
When the chain stops, all the pairs’ shifts sum up to at least
m. Let k be the number of transmissions we discover in the
argument. We have
∑k
i=1(s+ 1− bi) ≥ m. Since ` ≥ k, we
can replace k with ` and have the inequality
s`+ ` ≥
∑`
i=1
bi +m. (5)
b) Maximum Number of Satisfied Users: Here we con-
sider the maximum number of users that can be satisfied by
a given G. For one transmission of range b, the maximum
number of users that can be satisfied is 2(b − 1). Let the set
of users whose side information sets intersect but not contain
the range of gi be denoted by Qi, |Qi| ≤ 2(bi− 1). We argue
that all satisfied users must be in one of the Qi, i ∈ [`], i.e.,
|∪`i=1Qi| = m. This can be proved by contradiction. Without
loss of generality, let u1 be a user that is securely satisfied by
b1
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Fig. 1. Codewords and corresponding desired message pairs for the converse
bound.
G but not in any Qi. Thus G is a block diagonal matrix, and
Span(G) can be divided into two orthogonal spaces Span(G1)
and Span(G2). Span(G1) is not helpful for u1. In order for u1
to decode, there must be a standard basis vector in Span(G2)
and thus there is a standard basis contained in Span(G). This
violates the security constraint in [6, Proposition 1].
Therefore, by union bound we have m = | ∪`i=1 Qi| ≤∑`
i=1 |Qi| ≤ 2
∑`
i=1(bi − 1). Finally, we have∑`
i=1
bi ≥ m
2
+ `. (6)
c) Final Step: By combining (5) and (6) we have
` ≥ 3m
2s
, (7)
which is the desired converse bound in Theorem 2.
VI. ACHIEVABLE SCHEMES
When mm−s ∈ Z we use the achievable scheme for the
decentralized PICOD in [5]. The scheme satisfies the security
constraint since all users have all but one messages that are
involved in the codewords. Therefore, it is impossible for a
user to decode more than one message. The scheme is optimal
since it is optimal without security constraint.
Next we provide achievable schemes for two cases where
our converse under linear encoding constraint is tight. One of
the schemes can be further generalized to all even m. Lastly,
we provide a class of feasible cases with odd m and mm−s /∈ Z.
a) m2s ∈ Z: An optimal scheme is to send {w1+2sk +
w2+2sk, w3+2sk + ws−2+2sk, ws−3+2sk + ws−4+2sk}, k ∈
{0, 1, . . . , m2s − 1}, for a total of 3m2s transmissions.
b) s = 3 and even m: An optimal achievable scheme
is {w1+2k + w2+2k}, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m2 }, for a total of m/2
transmissions. Note that in this case 3m2s =
m
2 .
c) m is even: We can further generalize the scheme for
s = 3, even m case to all even m cases. The scheme transmits
{∑s−1+2k mod mi=1+2k wi}, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m2 + 1− d s2e}.
d) odd m, s = m − 3 ≥ 8, mm−s /∈ Z: This case
shows that not all odd m and mm−s /∈ Z are infeasible.
The scheme has four transmissions, {w1 +
∑m−7
2
i=1 w2i +
wm−6,
∑m−9
2
i=1 w2i+1+wm−5+wm4 , wm−3+wm−2, wm−1+
wm}. which are currently working to generalize.
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